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ABSTRACT 
 
One of the greatest achievements of the modern “New Consensus” view in 
macroeconomics is the assertion of a nonquantity theoretic approach to monetary policy. 
Leading theorists and practitioners of this view have indeed rejected the quantity theory 
of money, and defended a return to the old Wicksellian idea of eliminating high levels of 
inflation by adjusting nominal interest rates to changes in the price level. This paper 
evaluates these recent developments in the theory and practice of monetary policy in 
terms of two basic questions: 1) What is the monetary policy instrument controlled by the 
central bank? and 2) Which macroeconomic variables are affected in the short and long 
run by monetary policy? 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
It is almost trivial to claim that interest rates play a key role in the theory and practice of 
modern monetary policy. Central banks around the world use interest rates in their dual 
roles of instrument variables in order to achieve their objectives, and indicator variables 
to provide important information regarding the state of the economy. However, interest 
rates did not always enjoy such prominent roles in monetary policy. It was not long ago 
that Lucas made a mockery of central bankers and theoretical scholars who suggested 
controling inflation through the use of interest rates (Lucas 1996). It is indeed one of the 
greatest achievements of the modern “New Consensus” view in macroeconomics to have 
defended a non-quantity theoretic approach to monetary policy. Leading theorists and 
practitioners of this view (e.g., Woodford 2003 and Weber 2006, respectively) have 
maintained that the “New Consensus” approach to monetary policy is a rejection of the 
quantity theory of money and a return to the old Wicksellian idea of eliminating high 
levels of inflation by adjusting nominal interest rates to changes in the price level. 
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate these recent developments in the theory 
and practice of monetary policy in terms of two basic questions. Firstly, what is the 
monetary policy instrument controlled by the central bank? Secondly, which 
macroeconomic variables are affected in the short and long run by monetary policy? The 
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the quantity theory of money and its 
policy implications for the short-run and long-run effects of monetary policy. Section 3 
presents Wicksell’s two-interest rate analysis as a potential non-quantity theoretic 
approach to monetary policy. Section 4 focuses on the modern “New Consensus” model 
and its relation to Wicksell’s monetary analysis. Finally, Section 5 concludes.  
   
2  QUANTITY THEORETIC APPROACHES TO MONETARY POLICY 
 
Hicks is often quoted for having claimed that monetary theory, more than any other 
economic theory, is ineluctably related to reality. By its own nature, monetary theory  
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deals with, and evolves in response to, the historical evolution of actual economies 
(Hicks 1967; Fontana 2004a). From this, Hicks derives an important lesson for monetary 
theorists: changes in the level of output, employment, or inflation are often the product of 
monetary factors. Yet, Hicks is aware that the realism of monetary theory still leaves 
economists with plenty of freedom in their analyses. In particular, monetary economists 
still have to make two essential choices for their theories, namely which monetary 
variable matters and what it matters for. In modern terms, the first choice relates to the 
control variable of the central bank, i.e., monetary aggregates or the short-run interest 
rate. The second choice refers to the nominal or real effects of monetary policy. Table 1 
below presents the two essential choices that, according to Hicks, economists have to 
face when discussing the cause and effects of monetary policy.  
 
Table 1: Matrix of the causes and effects of monetary policy 
  Monetary Aggregates  Interest Rate 
Short Run  Real effects  
(Weak Classical tradition) 
Real effects 
(New Consensus approach) 
Long Run  Nominal effects 
(Strong Classical tradition) 
Real effects 
(Endogenous Money approach) 
 
 
The most popular position is labelled “Strong Classical” tradition in Table 1. 
Ricardo and most of his classical contemporaries, as well as many neoclassical 
economists, had all subscribed to the quantity theory of money and its axiom of neutrality 
of money. The control variable of the central bank is a monetary aggregate and the effects 
of monetary policy are only on the price level. However, Hicks identifies another 
quantity-theoretic monetary analysis, the so-called “Weak Classical” tradition in Table 1. 
This tradition, which includes, among others, the essay “Of Money” by Hume (1963) and 
the works of Mill (1874) and Thornton (1802), distinguishes between short- and long-run 
effects of changes in the money supply. In the short run, changes in the quantity of  
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monetary aggregates do affect the level of output and employment in a country, though 
these real effects disappear in the long run when a new equilibrium point is achieved. In 
the long run, money and monetary policy only affect the price level. From this 
perspective, the weak Classical tradition sets aside the axiom of neutrality of money in 
the short run, only to assert it again in the long run. It is clear that the difference between 
the weak and strong versions of the Classical tradition is simply a question of accepting 
or not some temporary real effects of money changes in the short run. In the long run, 
banning hysteresis effects, which in any case are never mentioned by this literature, the 
weak and strong versions of the Classical tradition are simply equivalent.   
Interestingly, the difference between the strong and weak version of the quantity-
theoretic analysis is also the main topic of the Nobel Lecture “Monetary Neutrality” by 
Robert Lucas (1996). In the lecture, Lucas considers the tension between the long-run 
neutrality of money and the short-run real effects of changes in the money supply. Like 
Hicks, Lucas appears to locate the nature of this tension in the ineluctable realism of 
monetary theory. For instance, he refers with interest to the work of several economists, 
including Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Sargent (1986), which have shown that 
changes in the money supply are often related to major business cycle fluctuations. From 
this perspective, according to Lucas, Milton Friedman is a modern follower of the weak 
version of the Classical tradition.  
Starting with his famous “Restatement” in 1956, Friedman was in fact responsible 
for the remarkable revival of the quantity theory of money at a time in which the 
Keynesian revolution had consigned it to oblivion. Like Hume, Milton Friedman 
maintained that the stock of money is (causally) neutral in the long run, but he conceded 
that changes in the money supply can have real effects in the short run, due to temporary 
elements of wage and price rigidity and money illusion. For instance, workers may be 
slow to realize the implications of an unanticipated increase in the money supply. Given 
the adaptive expectation process that characterizes wage negotiations in the labor market, 
this means that employment and output will temporarily increase. However, Friedman 
warned, once workers’ expectations catch up with the increase in the money supply and 
the price level, then these real effects of money changes will disappear.   
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A final point of Lucas’ in his Nobel Lecture is related to the conditions for 
assuring the long-run neutrality of money and monetary policy. The point is argued in 
two stages. Firstly, according to Lucas, there is no doubt that theoretical analyses of 
monetary policy should be conducted exclusively in terms of a path for the supply of 
money. For this reason, he pours scorn on the idea suggested by central bankers and some 
monetary economists of using the interest rate to control inflation (Lucas 1996). 
Monetary aggregates are, thus, the only theoretical variables that matter for discussing 
issues in monetary theory and policy. Secondly, against Tobin (1970), who argued that 
high correlation rates do not have any implication for the causality between inflation and 
monetary aggregates, Lucas interprets the strong correlation between money growth and 
inflation as a causal relationship. He refers with approval to the work of McCandless and 
Weber (1995), which examines data from 110 countries over a 30-year period. 
Depending on the definition of the money supply used, these authors find that the 
correlation between inflation and the growth rate of the money supply varies between 
0.92 and 0.96. 
In terms of Table 1, Lucas (1996) defends a strong version of the Classical 
tradition. Monetary aggregates are the key theoretical variables controlled by the central 
bank, which is causally responsible only for changes in the price level. In other words, 
Lucas is a strong supporter of the axiom of neutrality of money in the long run. More 
importantly, Lucas maintains that this axiom is necessarily grounded in a quantity-
theoretic monetary analysis, where monetary aggregates, rather than the short-run interest 
rate is the control variable of the central bank. The next section will show that the modern 
mainstream approach to monetary policy, the so-called “New Consensus” view, rejects 
the quantity-theoretic monetary framework defended by the weak and strong versions of 
the Classical tradition. This should not come as a surprise. Leading theorists and 
practitioners of the “New Consensus” view, like Woodford (2003) and Weber (2006), 
have claimed the origin of the approach in the two-interest-rates analysis of Wicksell 
(1935, 1936). Yet, the New Consensus view strongly supports the axiom of neutrality of 
money in the long run which, as argued in Section 4, is not necessarily a feature of the 
Wicksellian analysis. 
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3  A NON-QUANTITY THEORETIC APPROACH TO MONETARY POLICY: 
WICKSELL’S “TWO-INTEREST-RATES” ANALYSIS 
 
Over the last two decades several economists have praised the convergent paths of the 
theory and practice of monetary policy (e.g., Goodhart 2001). More recently, Woodford 
(2003) has offered a systematic and rigorous representation of this “New Consensus” 
view of monetary policy. Importantly, Woodford has also claimed that the “New 
Consensus” view is a modern restatement and development of Wicksell’s two-interest-
rates analysis as famously set out by the Swedish author in Interest and Prices when 
discussing the case of a “pure credit economy” (Wicksell 1936).  
There are at least two features of Wicksell’s “pure credit economy” which seem 
to have inspired Woodford and his colleagues. Firstly, the substitution of monetary 
aggregates with the short-run interest rate as the main control variable of the central bank. 
Secondly, the reversal of the causality implied by the quantity-theoretic monetary 
analysis, namely that changes in the price level cause changes in the money supply. In 
other words, for Woodford, Wicksell is the economist who, more than everyone else, has 
rejected the now discredited quantity-theoretic analysis of inflation in favor of an original 
two-interest-rates analysis of it.
1 In terms of Table 1, this means a move from column 1 to 
column 2. For this reason, Woodford builds on Wicksell’s “pure credit economy” in 
order to propose the model of a cashless and frictionless economy, for the purpose of 
presenting a core model for explaining the key features of modern monetary policy. 
Wicksell’s “pure credit economy” can be described by the following sequential process 
(Wicksell 1936): 
(a)  Banks grant loans to entrepreneurs who use them to pay for the inputs, 
namely the wages of workers. Money has thus the nature of a 
debt/credit relationship with no intrinsic value. 
(b)  Workers have their wages credited to their bank deposits which are 
then used to buy commodities from the merchant capitalists. These 
commodities represent the real savings of the merchant capitalists. In 
                                                 
1 See, however, Humphrey (2002) for a discussion of the arguments supporting a quantity-
theoretic interpretation of Wicksell’s monetary analysis.   
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this process, thus, workers transform real savings (commodities) into 
money savings (bank deposits). 
(c)  In the final stage of the production process, the merchant capitalists use 
their money savings to buy the newly produced commodities from the 
entrepreneurs. As a result of this exchange, bank deposits of the 
merchant capitalists are transferred to entrepreneurs. Bank deposits are 
then employed by entrepreneurs for the repayment of loans to banks. If 
banks set an interest rate on loans equal to the real return on the 
production process, then investments are equal to savings, the 
economy is in equilibrium, and the marginalist rules of distribution are 
respected. At the end of the production process, merchant capitalists 
receive the total amount of newly produced commodities net of the 
remunerations to the entrepreneurs, banks, and workers for their 
contributions to the production process. Merchant capitalist receive the 
real return of the production process because of their initial savings of 
commodities.     
 
According to Wicksell, this sequential process is instrumental to the idea of 
explaining the general movement of prices via the distinction between the natural real 
interest rate (NRI or ρ) and the loan interest rate (r).  
The natural real interest rate (NRI or ρ) is a pure commodity rate, and it is thus 
determined by the scarcity of saving (capital).
2 As Wicksell explains, NRI is “the rate of 
interest which would be determined by supply and demand if no use were made of money 
and all lending were effected in the form of real capital goods” (Wicksell 1936). The loan 
interest rate (r) is the interest rate on bank loans, which is set by banks when granting 
credit to entrepreneurs. In equilibrium, banks set (r) equal to NRI. However, this 
equilibrium condition is only obtained by chance, the reason being that the loan rate is 
fixed in a discretionary way by banks. It is, thus, a controlled or contractual rate. By 
contrast, NRI is defined in natura, i.e., it is governed by the marginal productivity of 
                                                 
2 See Seccareccia (2003) and Smithin (1994) for a discussion of the Wicksell’s two-interest-rates 
analysis and its relation to Friedman’s natural rate of unemployment analysis.  
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capital. Importantly, NRI is not a constant but it changes as a result of movements of the 
variables affecting the marginal productivity of capital. The coincidence between (r) and 
(ρ) is thus accidental. Indeed, their difference is the main explanation for the change in 
the price level. In other words, and against the conclusions of the quantity-theoretic 
analysis of inflation, an inflationary (deflationary) process is triggered off whenever 
banks set the loan rate (r) lower (higher) than the exogenously shifting natural real 
interest rate (ρ).  
Wicksell’s two-interest-rates analysis of inflation can be described in the 
following way. When (r) is lower than (ρ), entrepreneurs (i.e., investors) can now gain a 
positive (extra) profit at the expense of the merchant capitalists (i.e., savers). Therefore, 
entrepreneurs now borrow more credit from banks and increase investments. The 
opposite would occur if banks set (r) above (ρ). Importantly, in either case, the level of 
(real) savings of the merchant capitalists has not changed. The difference between 
investments and savings is, thus, a positive function of the gap between the NRI and the 
loan rate: 
( ) ( )
+
− = − r f S I ρ  (1) 
According to Wicksell, it is this difference between investments and savings 
which is the main cause of changes in the price level. For instance, when the loan rate (r) 
is set to a lower level than the NRI (ρ), Equation (1) explains that entrepreneurs increase 
investments via an increase in the demand for bank loans. Since in Wicksell’s “pure 
credit economy” banks can create ex nihilo credit in excess of merchant capitalists’ real 
savings, banks accommodate the demand for loans of entrepreneurs. However, Wicksell 
assumes that the normal situation of the economy is characterized by full employment, 
with the result that an increase in investment spending by entrepreneurs causes an 
increase in the price level (P). In algebraic terms, this means that the inflation rate (π) is a 
function of the difference between investment and saving, and hence, through Equation 








ρ π    (2)  
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There are several features of Wicksell’s two-interest-rates analysis of inflation 
which are of interest to modern monetary economists (Tamborini 2006). First of all, 
money is an endogenous rather than an exogenous variable (Arestis and Sawyer 2006). 
This means that the stock of money in a country is not controlled by the central bank like 
in the strong and weak versions of the quantity-theoretic analysis or the textbook IS-LM 
model, but rather it is the natural outcome of the production process. Woodford (2003) 
champions the endogeneity hypothesis of the money supply process,
3 though he discusses 
it exclusively in terms of the reserve market. Woodford (2003) argues that modern central 
banks, like the Bank of England and the U.S. Federal Reserve, implement their interest 
rate target through a two-step procedure. Firstly, they set the short-run interest rate 
without any consideration of the size of open market operations, and then, and only then, 
they instruct the relevant financial departments to operate in the open market, namely 
buying or selling Treasury securities or equivalent so as to maintain the overnight interest 
rate near target (Woodford 2003). By replacing a rule for base-money growth with an 
interest rate rule, modern central banks have thus vindicated Wicksell’s monetary 
analysis. The stock of money in a country is the residual of the production process which 
is triggered off by the demand for loans of entrepreneurs. Here, nevertheless, there is an 
important difference with supporters of the “New Consensus” view, who often conflate 
banks and the central bank in a generic banking system (Goodhart 2004). In his two-
interest-rates analysis of inflation, Wicksell assumes that banks can create ex nihilo credit 
in excess of merchant capitalists’ savings. In the production process, banks thus play an 
essential role in accommodating the investment plans of entrepreneurs. The endogeneity 
hypothesis of the money supply process is thus relevant, not only for the analysis of the 
reserve market but also for the analysis of the credit market, where commercial banks and 
entrepreneurs negotiate the interest rate on loans (Lavoie 1992; Graziani 2003; Fontana 
2004b).  
A second feature of Wicksell’s analysis which is of interest to modern monetary 
economists is the distinction between the equilibrium and disequilibrium conditions, 
where, according to Wicksell, the former is a special case of the latter. In the “pure credit 
                                                 
3 See Moore (1988) and Lavoie (1996) for a full statement of the endogenous money hypothesis 
and its policy implications.  
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economy” described above, entrepreneurs are borrowers and commercial banks are 
lenders. In equilibrium, i.e., when banks set the loan rate (r) equal to the NRI (ρ) via the 
credit supply process, banks simply transform the real savings of merchant capitalists in 
nominal savings, namely bank deposits, which are then used by entrepreneurs to repay 
their initial bank loans. However, commercial banks do not know the NRI (ρ), since the 
marginal productivity of capital fluctuates over the business cycle. This means that when 
setting the loan rate they will be able to achieve the equilibrium condition only by pure 
chance. The normal case is, thus, an out-of-equilibrium situation where the gap between 
the NRI (ρ) and the loan rate produces an imbalance between investments and savings. 
Importantly, this imbalance is accommodated by commercial banks, which can change ex 
nihilo the supply of loans. From this perspective, it is the nature of modern monetary 
economies, where banks and credit play a key role in the production process, that is 
responsible for any inflationary or deflationary process. As explained by Wicksell (1936), 
“ prices constitute … a spiral spring which serves to transmit the power between the 
natural and the money rates of interest; but the spring must first be sufficiently stretched 
or compressed. In a pure cash economy, the spring is short and rigid; it becomes longer 
an more elastic in accordance with the stage of development of the system of credit and 
banking” (Wicksell 1936). Again, as before, it seems extraordinary that the “New 
Consensus” view has rejected the quantity-theoretic analysis in favor of Wicksell’s two-
interest-rates analysis, and yet it has left behind an important feature of that analysis, 
namely the role of commercial banks, rather than simply central banks, in the explanation 
of the production process and related money supply process.
4 This is particularly curious 
because leading theorists and practitioners of the “New Consensus” view, like Weber 
(2006) and Woodford (2003), have recognized the originality of Wicksell’s monetary 
analysis and its rejection of both propositions of the strong and weak versions of the 
quantity-theoretic approaches to monetary policy, namely that (a) theoretical analyses of 
monetary policy should be conducted exclusively in terms of monetary aggregates, and 
(b) the correlation between monetary aggregates and inflation has to be interpreted in 
terms of a causal relationship. The next section will actually show that, against what 
                                                 
4 For instance, there is no entry for “banks” in the index of Woodford (2003).  
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leading theorists and practitioners of the “New Consensus” view have claimed, the “New 
Consensus” view has not fully embraced Wicksell’s monetary analysis, and by doing it, 
have missed potential venues for further developments of this non-quantity-theoretic 
approach to money and monetary policy.  
 
4  THE “NEW CONSENSUS” VIEW OF MONETARY POLICY   
 
In the previous Section, Wicksell’s two-interest-rates analysis has been presented as an 
alternative framework to the strong and weak versions of the quantity-theoretic 
approaches to money and monetary policy discussed in Section 1. Importantly, 
Wicksell’s monetary analysis is now claimed to be the foundation for the current 
mainstream approach to money and monetary policy. Interestingly, the same has been 
claimed by a different group of economists, the Circuitists, and more generally the 
“Endogenous Money” theorists (Fontana 2004a).
5 This section discusses these claims, 
starting with an overview of  the “New Consensus” view of monetary policy. 
Fontana and Palacio Vera (2005) discuss at great length the so-called “New 
Consensus” view in macroeconomics and its policy implications. Basically, the “New 
Consensus” view endorses a modified version of the old neo-classical synthesis 
dichotomy between the real and the monetary sectors. The modification comes from the 
New Keynesian proposition, supported by a variety of micro-founded models, that 
nominal rigidities prevent wage and price clearing the labor and goods markets more or 
less continuously. In other words, as argued by Tamborini (2006), New Keynesian 
scholars have accepted and built on the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) 
proposed by New Classical scholars in the 1970s and 1980s. This modern class of DSGE 
models are based on several classical assumptions, including intertemporal optimization 
and the Ricardian Equivalence theorem. Intertemporal optimization of household is 
important to support the view that investments depend on the cost of capital alone, hence 
                                                 
5 See, for instance, Graziani who explicitly refers to Wicksell’s “pure credit economy” as the core 
model of the theory of the monetary circuit (Graziani 2003). See, also, Bellofiore (2005), and 
Realfonzo (2006).  
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ruling out immediately any possibility for Keynesian animal spirits and hysteresis effects 
(Sawyer 2002). Similarly, the Ricardian Equivalence theorem, namely the assumption 
that the method of financing any particular path of government expenditure is irrelevant, 
is essential to rule out fiscal policy. In these modern class of DSGE models, all major 
Classical features are confirmed. In particular, the potential level of output, the natural 
level of real wage, and the equilibrium real interest rate are determined only by 
technology and tastes, i.e., they are invariant to changes of monetary policy. The original 
contribution of New Keynesian scholars has, thus, been to introduce in these classical 
models some non-classical features, such as to give some role to the Keynesian principle 
of effective demand, and hence some support to active stabilization policies, especially in 
the form of monetary policy. The empirically grounded proposition that nominal 
rigidities prevent wage and price clearing in the labor and goods markets more or less 
continuously responds to this theoretical requirement. These nominal rigidities provide 
the rationale for Keynesian real effects of changes in nominal variables. However, once 
the nominal rigidities disappear, the real effects vanish altogether. In short, the “New 
Consensus” view in macroeconomics implies that money and monetary policy only have 
real effects in the short run due to nominal rigidities, but they are neutral in the long run.  
In its most basic form, the policy implications of the “New Consensus” view in 
macroeconomics can be represented by three equations describing the dynamics of the 
interest rate, output, and inflation.
6 The first equation deals with aggregate supply, the 








                                                 
6 The important role of lags and expectations are ignored in this basic representation of the “New 
Consensus” view. See Woodford (2003) for a discussion of the role played by lags and 
expectations in modern monetary policy strategies.  
() t t t t s y y g , − = π
( ) t t t t t z X r h y y , , = −
( ) 
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Equation (3) expresses current inflation (πt) as a function of the output gap which 
is defined as the difference between actual output (yt) and its potential level ( t y ). The 
error term (st) encapsulates any other factor affecting current inflation. Equation (4) is a 
“new” IS curve relating the output gap to the short-run real interest rate (r), and a vector 
of variables (X) measuring movements in exogenous variables like government 
expenditure, tax structure, and net exports. The variable (zt) is an error term. Finally, 
Equation (5) shows a simple policy strategy for the central bank. The gap between the 
actual real interest rate (r) and its NRI level (ρ) is a function of the difference between 
current inflation (πt) and the target inflation rate (π*).
7  
There are some important observations that can be derived from this simple set of 
equations representing the policy implications of the “New Consensus” view. First, 
monetary aggregates do not appear in any equation. In particular, they do not appear in 
Equation (5) which describes the policy strategy of the central bank. Consistency with the 
quantity theory of money would indeed require replacing Equation (5) with an LM curve 







, ρ =      (6) 
 
The key difference between Equation (5) and Equation (6) is related to Hicks’s 
suggestion for discriminating between different approaches to monetary policy. 
According to the “New Consensus” view, central banks set the shot-run nominal interest 
rate, but due to price and wage rigidities, they are able to control the short-run real 
interest rate (r), and hence, to influence market interest rates. This means that modern 
central banks control the interest rate and not monetary aggregates. As in the case of 
Wicksell’s monetary analysis, the “New Consensus” view supports the endogenous 
money hypothesis rather than the exogenous money hypothesis of the strong and weak 
versions of the quantity-theoretic approach. Importantly, through their policy influence 
on market interest rates, central banks expect to be able to affect different components of 
                                                 
7 See Fontana and Palacio Vera (2005) for a growth rate interpretation of Equations 3–5.  
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aggregate demand [see Equation (4)], and hence, to change the first item of the output 
gap (yt- t y ), and thereby, via Equation (3), to control the inflation rate (πt). 
A second observation that can be derived from the “New Consensus” equations 
above relates to the role of inflation and its relationship with monetary aggregates. From 
Equation (5) it is clear that when the central bank sets the short-run real interest rate (r) at 
its NRI level (ρ), then current inflation (πt) is at the target inflation rate (π*). Thus, the 
question is how the central bank is able to set (r) at just the NRI level. It is here that most 
of all the Wicksellian features of the “New Consensus” come to the forefront. 
In Wicksell’s two-interest-rates analysis, inflation is a summary statistics showing 
the state of imbalance of the economy. Wicksell’s tenet is that the inflation responds to 
the same rules governing the price level in a single market. Just as a divergence between 
the demand for and the supply of a commodity causes a movement in the price of a 
particular commodity, then, Wicksell argues, any movement of the aggregate price level 
is in a similar way caused by a divergence between aggregate demand and aggregate 
supply. If this is the case, then the banking system does not need to ascertain NRI before 
setting the loan rate. As long as the aggregate price level is constant, the banking system 
can be confident that the loan rate is matching NRI, and it only needs to respond to 
movements of the price level in one direction or the other. In similar fashion, the 
proponents of the “New Consensus” view maintain that changes in the inflation rate are 
indicative of an imbalance in the economy, the level of aggregate demand being higher 
than the natural level of aggregate supply. This excessive level of aggregate demand puts 
pressure in the goods and labor markets with the result of an increase in the price and 
wage levels. Therefore, in the “New Consensus” view, as long as the inflation rate is 
constant, central banks can be confident that the market rate is matching NRI. It is only 
when the current inflation rate is not constant that they have to engage in aggregate 
demand fine-tuning policy via changes in the short-run nominal interest rate.  
Equations (3–5) describe the dynamics of inflation, output, and interest rate when 
the current rate of inflation is not at its target level. In particular, Equation (3) shows that 
the inflation rate increases when the current level of output (yt) is greater than its natural 
or potential level ( t y ). But, Equation (4) relates the difference between the current and 
potential levels of output (the so-called output gap) to, among other things, the real  
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interest rate (r). More precisely, Equation (4) relates the current component of the output 
gap to the real interest rate (r). In other words, just like Wicksell originally did, 
proponents of the “New Consensus” view maintain that the potential level of output ( t y ) 
is not affected by aggregate demand, and hence does not respond to changes in the real 
interest rate (r). If this is the case, when the inflation rate increases, the central bank 
simply needs to increase the short-term nominal interest rate and, given short-run price 
and wage sluggishness, the real interest rate (r) will also raise. As a result, the aggregate 
demand will be negatively affected. The current level of output will thus decline and with 
it, the current inflation rate. The process will stop when the central bank moves the real 
interest rate (r) to its NRI level (ρ), at which point the output gap is nil and the inflation 
rate will be constant at its target rate (π*). Similar conclusions follow in the case of a 
deflationary process. 
However, there is a serious shortcoming with a similar adjustment mechanism, 
namely it relies on the axiom of the long-run neutrality of money and monetary policy. 
Thus, from this perspective the “New Consensus” view maintains the same policy 
conclusions of the S-Classics and W-Classics approaches, though via a theoretical 
framework that has replaced the monetary aggregates with the interest rate. Where the 
two classical approaches assumed that in no circumstance would monetary aggregates 
affect the long-run level of output and employment in a country, in similar way the “New 
Consensus” view maintains that the interest rate (r) never influences the potential level of 
output ( t y ). In other words, proponents of the “New Consensus” view hold that the real 
interest rate, via changes in the aggregate demand, only affects current output. By 
contrast, the aggregate supply, which is exogenously determined by the level of capital, 
workforce, and technology, only affect the potential level of output. In terms of Table 1, 
this means that the “New Consensus” view only supports real effects of money and 
monetary policy in the short run.  
Another way of explaining the “New Consensus” support for the axiom of the 
long-run neutrality of money and monetary policy is to say that in mainstream monetary 
policy the short-run real interest rate (r) does not have any effect on its NRI level (ρ). As 
long as the former is different from the latter, prices and wages are altered and, as a result 
of these changes, the short-run real interest rate (r) converges to its exogenously  
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determined NRI level (ρ). Interestingly, Wicksell himself seems to have maintained the 
assumption of independence between the loan rate (r) and the NRI level (ρ), though in the 
Swedish edition of the Lectures (Wicksell 1935), he accepted, as a concession to his 
critics, the possibility of the interdependence between the two different interest rates. 
This possibility has been further explored by a follower of Wicksell, Erick Lindahl 
(1939), who has paid particular attention to the real effects of monetary policy.
8 In the 
Part II of his classic Studies, Lindahl (1939) argues that only under a very special 
assumption can NRI (ρ) be conceived to be determined purely by technical conditions, 
namely the assumption of complete homogeneity of inputs and outputs. A possible 
illustration of this case would be an agricultural economy, where a scarce commodity is 
sown on free land with the help of free labor services (Lindahl 1939). In the more general 
case of a monetary economy, NRI (ρ) depends also on the price level and hence, via the 
effects on the costs and returns of economic activities, it cannot exist independently from 
the short-run real interest rate (r).      
 
The real interest factor [i.e., NRI (ρ)] in a certain period can be expressed as the relation 
between anticipated future product values and the values invested during the period. The 
prices of invested services are, however, influenced by the demands of entrepreneurs, and 
these in turns are influenced by the loan rate of interest itself [i.e., the short-run real 
interest rate (r)]. … We accordingly find that the real interest rate on capital, as here 
defined, has a tendency to adjust itself to the actual loan rate of interest in every period 
(Lindahl 1939). 
 
Lindahl offers an exemplification of the convergence of the NRI (ρ) toward the 
short-run real interest rate (r) when discussing the cumulative inflationary (deflationary) 
process caused by lowering (raising) the short-run real interest rate (r) (Lindahl 1939). As 
indicated in Equation (1), a fall in (r) leads to an excess of investments over savings, and 
the subsequent increase in the price level (Equation 2) implies higher incomes to 
entrepreneurs. These windfall profits woud replenish the level of savings and, hence, 
                                                 
8 See Costabile (2005) for an analysis of the interplay between analytical and ideological ideas in 
the elaboration of different theories of money and monetary policy. She argues that the pre-
analytical view of economists are at least as important as their theoretical models in explaining 
their support or rejection for the axiom of long-run neutrality of monetary policy.   
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adjust them to the higher credit-driven level of investments. This amounts to say that 
through the inflation process the redistribution of real income from wage workers to 
entrepreneurs causes NRI (ρ) to converge toward the lower level of the short-run real 
interest rate (r).
9 
The assumtion of interdependence between the short-run real interest rate (r) and 
its NRI (ρ) has been further developed by another group of modern monetary economists 
who have claimed Wicksell’s analysis to be the foundation of their non-quantity-theoretic 
approach to money and monetary policy, namely the “Endogenous Money” view 
(Fontana 2004a). In this alternative interpretation of Wicksell’s “two interest rate 
analysis,” the interdependence between the short-run real interest rate (r) and the NRI 
level (ρ) is discussed in terms of the effects of (r), via changes in the aggregate demand, 
on both components of the output gap of Equation (3), namely current and potential 
levels of output. 
Like the “New Consensus” view, supporters of the “Endogenous Money” 
interpretation of Wicksell’s monetary analysis reject both main propositions of the strong 
and weak versions of the quantity-theoretic approaches to monetary policy, namely that 
(a) theoretical analyses of monetary policy should be conducted exclusively in terms of 
monetary aggregates, and (b) the correlation between monetary aggregates and inflation 
has to be interpreted in terms of a causal relationship from the former to the latter. 
However, in contrast with the “New Consensus” view, they maintain that there is now a 
large literature suggesting that persistent, but nevertheless transitory, changes in 
aggregate demand due to changes in the interest rate controlled by the central bank, may 
have permanent effects on current and potential levels of output and hence, on the NRI 
(ρ). If this is the case, then it cannot be excluded that monetary policy has long-run 
effects on output and employment. Therefore, the axiom of neutrality of money and 
monetary policy is untenable either in the short run or the long run. In terms of Table 1, 
the “Endogenous Money” view holds that the control variable of central banks is the 
                                                 
9 For a general discussion of Lindahl’s analysis of the cumulative inflationary (deflationary) 
process caused by lowering (raising) the level of short-run real interest rate (r) under different 
assumptions about the level of employment of input and price expectations, and its modern 
relevance for the “New Consensus” view, see Boianovsky and Trautwein (2006a, 2006b).   
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interest rate and that by changing this variable, central banks can produce short-run and 
long-run real effects in the economy.  
These long-run effects of aggregate demand are usually discussed in the 
“Endogenous Money” view under two headings, namely demand-led growth models and 
hysteresis models (Fontana and Palacio-Vera 2005). Demand-led growth models show 
that by acting upon the supply of labor, the availability of capital, and the level of 
technology in the economy, aggregate demand can alter the potential levels of output and 
employment in a country. Aggregate demand also plays a significant long-run role in 
hysteresis models through two complementary theoretical hypotheses, namely the “labor 
market phenomena” hypothesis (Ball 1999) and the “capital shortage” hypothesis (Arestis 
and Biefang-Frisancho Mariscal 1998 and 2000). Basically, these models show that by 
curbing aggregate demand, central banks may permanently alter the labor market (e.g., 
via depreciation of skills and loss of work motivation in unemployed individuals) and the 
capital market (e.g., via lower level of investment and hence lower capital stock). As a 
result of these changes, when aggregate demand finally returns to its original level, the 
supply of labor and of capital does not bounce back (Sawyer 2002).  
  
5  CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
Modern mainstream economists have abandoned the quantity-theoretic approach to 
money and monetary policy in favor of the old Wicksellian idea of eliminating high 
levels of inflation by adjusting nominal interest rates to changes in the price level. This 
paper has evaluated these recent developments in terms of two basic questions, namely 
what is the monetary policy instrument controlled by the central bank, and which 
macroeconomic variables are affected in the short and long run by monetary policy.  
There is no doubt that the “New Consensus” approach to monetary policy has 
made highly important contributions to the modern theory and practice of monetary 
policy. To start with, the “New Consensus” approach has rejected the two fundamental, 
and yet most untenable, propositions of the classical theory of money, namely that central 
banks control monetary aggregates rather than interest rates and, by doing this, they can  
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control the price level. More importantly, the “New Consensus” approach to monetary 
policy has replaced this quantity theoretic approach to monetary policy with a non-
quantity theoretic approach, namely Wicksell’s “two-interest-rates” analysis. In this 
alternative approach, the supply of money is not controlled by the central bank, but rather 
it is the natural outcome of the economic process. In other words, money is endogenous 
not exogenous. In addition, once the endogeneity of money is acknowledged, then it 
naturally follows that the relationship between the short-run real interest rate (r) and the 
NRI (ρ) becomes prominent in the explanation of changes in the price level and the levels 
of output and employment over the business cycle. Unfortunately, on this point, the “New 
Consensus” approach to monetary policy has failed to achieve the full potential of the 
Wicksellian monetary analysis. By assuming independence of the NRI (ρ) from the short-
run real interest rate (r), leading theorist and practitioners of the “New Consensus” view 
have gone back to the most influential conclusion of the classical theory of money—
monetary policy is neutral in the long run. This paper has argued that this represents the 
main limitation and possibly the most important challenge for the future development of 
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